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Home Rule in New York: The Need 
For a Change 
 
By Michael A. Cardozo & Zachary W. Klinger* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Throughout the twelve years that one of the authors served 
as the Corporation Counsel for the city of New York under Mayor 
Michael R. Bloomberg, the Law Department litigated thousands 
of cases involving issues ranging from taxation to transportation 
to the proper scope of governmental activity.  As often arises 
from city politics, some of these matters resulted from disputes 
between Mayor Bloomberg and the State while many others 
involved disagreements with the New York City Council.1  In 
fact, during Mayor Bloomberg’s first term alone, a recalcitrant 
City Council overrode his vetoes a record thirty-five times.2  
Regardless of the subject of contention, one issue manifested 
itself repeatedly—involving the power of municipalities to self-
govern without state intervention—Home Rule.3  The clashes 
with the City Council often implicated the State (and thus Home 
Rule) regardless of whether the litigation involved gay rights, 
procurement standards, collective bargaining, or even taxis.  
The author’s twelve years of experience as corporation counsel 
afforded him an inside look into the practicalities and nuances 
of the Home Rule debate and provided him with a greater 
understanding of Home Rule’s benefits as well as its flaws. 
This article is intended to provide a practical lens into how 
these Home Rule issues unfold in complex matters involving the 
 
*  Michael A. Cardozo (JD Columbia Law School 1966, BA Brown University 
1963) is a partner at Proskauer Rose LLP.  He served as the New York City 
Corporation Counsel under Mayor Michael Bloomberg from 2002-2013.  
Zachary W. Klinger (JD New York University School of Law 2015, AB 
Princeton University 2010) is an associate at Proskauer Rose LLP. 
1. See Winnie Hu, Mayor Need Not Enforce Certain Laws, Court Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/nyregion/may
or-need-not-enforce-certain-laws-court-rules.html. 
2. Id. 
3. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (commonly referred to as the “Home Rule” 
provision). 
1
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City, and to suggest how a much-needed Home Rule 
constitutional amendment could re-shape or, at the very least, 
clarify Home Rule standards.  Section II will provide some 
historical and legal background on Home Rule; Section III will 
analyze some of the more well-known Home Rule cases that the 
Law Department litigated during the Bloomberg 
Administration; and Section IV will discuss insights gleaned 
with respect to, and will offer several recommendations for, the 
future of Home Rule in New York. 
 
II. Legal Background 
 
Adopted in 19634 with the intended purpose, in the words of 
former Governor Rockefeller, of “strengthen[ing] the 
governments closest to the people so that they may help meet 
the present and emerging needs of [the] time,”5 article IX, 
section 2 of the New York State Constitution (commonly referred 
to as the “Home Rule” provision) allocates power between the 
state and local governments.6  Under section 2(c), the “center of 
home rule powers,”7 every local government is empowered: 
(1) To adopt or amend local laws relating to its 
“property, affairs or government” which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution or any general law; and 
(2) To adopt or amend local laws, not inconsistent 
with the Constitution or any general law, 
 
4. While the New York State Constitution has always carved out limited 
spheres of local autonomy, a full Home Rule constitutional amendment was 
not adopted until 1923.  See Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1966).  At that time, local legislative powers 
were delegated to municipalities in only nine specific areas.  Id. at 1147.  A 
1928 statute permitted local governments to act, consistent with general law, 
in matters relating to their “property, affairs or government,” but local 
authority remained weak.  Id. at 1147-48.  The basic form and substance of the 
1923 amendment would remain in effect until the adoption of new Home Rule 
provisions in 1963.  Id. 
5. ROBERT B. WARD, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT 547 (2d ed. 2006). 
6. See id. at 547-49. 
7. PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW 
YORK 290 (1996). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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relating to ten enumerated subjects,8 whether 
or not they relate to its “property, affairs, or 
government” subject, however, to the power of 
the Legislature, under Section 2(b)(3), to 
restrict the adoption of such a local law not 
relating to property, affairs or government.9 
Under section 2(b)(2), this means that the state legislature is 
specifically prohibited from acting with respect to the “property, 
affairs or government of any local government,” except by 
general law or by special law enacted at the request of two-thirds 
of the membership of a local legislative body, or at the “request 
of its chief executive officer concurred in by a majority” of the 
legislative body, or except in the case of New York City, by a two-
thirds vote of each house upon receiving a “certificate of 
necessity from the governor.”10 
While the “rights, powers, privileges and immunities” 
afforded to local governments by article IX are to be “liberally 
construed,”11 section 3(a) explicitly states that the 
aforementioned limitations on the State’s power do not “restrict 
or impair any power of the legislature” with regard to: (1) the 
public school system or any retirement system pertaining to 
 
8. The “ten enumerated subjects” being:  
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of 
selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of 
work, protection, welfare and safety of [local] officers and 
employees. (2) In the case of a city, town or village, the 
membership and composition of the local legislative body. (3) 
The transaction of its business; (4) The incurring of its 
obligations. (5) The presentation, ascertainment and 
discharge of claims against it. (6) The acquisition, care, 
management and use of its highways, roads, streets, avenues 
and property. (7) The acquisition of its transit facilities and 
the ownership and operation thereof. (8) The levy, collection 
and administration of [its] taxes . . . . (9) The wages or 
salaries, the hours of work or labor, and the protection, 
welfare and safety of persons employed by any contractor or 
sub-contractor performing work, labor or services for it. (10) 
The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health 
and well-being of its people and property.   
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2(c)(ii)(1)-(10). 
9. Id. art. IX, § 2(c). 
10. Id. art. IX § 2(b)(2). 
11. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1994).  
3
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such, (2) the courts, and (3) matters outside the scope of the 
property, affairs or government of a local government.12 
Briefly, general laws apply to all localities in the state while 
special laws apply to “one or more, but not all,” localities.13  
There are no constitutional limits on the power of the legislature 
to pass general laws.  However, for the legislature to pass a 
special law that would affect only a particular locality’s property, 
affairs or government, it must receive a Home Rule message (i.e., 
a formal request from the locality for the State to intervene).14 
There are two important limitations on the restrictions 
imposed on the legislature in enacting what would appear to be 
special laws.  First, in the case of New York City, under the 
classification doctrine, a law is considered general even if it 
applies only to a limited number of localities (e.g., “cities having 
a population of 1,000,000 or more,”)15 so long as the law is based 
upon characteristics reasonably related to the subject of the law, 
and it does not serve merely to designate and identify the places 
to be affected.16 
The second limitation on the restriction of the State’s 
authority to enact what would appear to be a special law lies in 
a doctrine, first articulated in Chief Judge Cardozo’s concurring 
opinion in Adler v. Deegan.17  Under Adler, when the State 
possesses a substantial interest in the subject matter, and the 
enactment bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate 
accompanying substantial state concern, the State may legislate 
on what would otherwise be a local matter.18  In Adler, the court 
of appeals found constitutional a state-enacted multiple 
dwelling law—applicable only to cities of more than eight-
 
12. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a). 
13. Id. art. IX, §§ 3(d)(1), (4).   
14. Id. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)(a).  
15. See generally, Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817, 831 (N.Y. 1956) 
(holding classification based on population to be a general law that did not 
violate N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17).  While beyond the focus of this article, the 
classification doctrine, though long accepted, in practice allows for the 
curtailment of Home Rule authority; its impact may also merit re-thinking.   
16. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17. 
17. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 709-14 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J., 
concurring). 
18. Id. at 713-14. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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hundred thousand inhabitants19 and promulgated to combat 
hazardous and unsanitary living conditions in city tenements—
notwithstanding that it had been enacted without a Home Rule 
message. 
Such a request would ordinarily be required for state 
legislation applicable only to a particular locality.  In upholding 
the law, and articulating what would become known as the 
substantial state concern doctrine, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote: 
“[w]here the area sought to be legislated implicates concerns 
that overlap and intermingle between the State and the locality, 
but involves a substantial State concern, the State may freely 
legislate notwithstanding the fact that the concern of the State 
may also touch upon local matters.”20  While the Adler opinion 
was issued more than thirty years before the adoption of the 
present Home Rule constitutional provisions, it remains, as 
discussed below, a guiding principle of Home Rule today. 
Courts focus on the stated purpose and legislative history of 
the act in question to assess whether a substantial state interest 
exists.  For an act to bear a reasonable relationship to the 
substantial state interest, it must advance the asserted state 
interest.21 
In addition to the substantial state concern doctrine, 
preemption principles also bear heavily on the analytic 
framework of Home Rule.  Preemption can be either express or 
implied.22 Express preemption occurs when a state statute is 
explicitly intended to preempt local law,23 while implied 
preemption exists when a local law either conflicts with a state 
statute (i.e., conflict preemption) or intrudes on an area for 
which the State has “assumed full regulatory responsibility” or 
 
19. See id. at 709.  While Justice Pound, in concurrence, recognized that 
the Multiple Dwelling Law could be upheld under the classification doctrine 
discussed above, the law was ultimately found constitutional on other grounds 
(i.e., the State’s police power).  Id. at 709-10 (Pound, J., concurring). 
20. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., Inc., 642 
N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (citing Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 
(N.Y. 1929)).  
21. See Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State (Green Cabs), 993 N.E.2d 393, 
400 (N.Y. 2013). 
22. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 190 (N.Y. 
2001). 
23. Id.  
5
CARDOZO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  10:08 PM 
2017 HOME RULE IN NEW YORK 95 
has demonstrated a need for statewide uniformity (i.e., field 
preemption).24  As the court of appeals has explained: 
Where it is determined that the State has 
preempted an entire field, a local law regulating 
the same subject matter is deemed inconsistent 
with the State’s overriding interests because it 
either (1) prohibits conduct which the State law, 
although perhaps not expressly speaking to, 
considers acceptable or at least does not proscribe 
or (2) imposes additional restrictions on rights 
granted by State law.25 
The substantial state concern and preemption doctrines have 
had a dramatic impact on the power dynamic between the 
legislature and local authorities. In practice, both doctrines have 
effectively curbed the autonomy of local governments—even 
though, as the court of appeals has written, “the 1963 home rule 
amendment was intended to expand and secure the powers 
enjoyed by local governments.”26  The next section will address 
the formidable role the preemption and substantial state 
concern doctrines played in the Home Rule cases litigated during 
the Bloomberg years. 
 
III. Home Rule and the Bloomberg Administration 
 
 A. Express Preemption 
 
The earliest Home Rule problems faced by the Bloomberg 
Administration were unsolvable at the local level because of 
express preemption.  First, in the wake of the devastating 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the City found itself in the midst 
of a deep financial crisis.27 Facing a potential six billion dollar 
deficit, the City needed substantial additional revenue but 
 
24. Id.  
25. Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987) 
(internal citations omitted).   
26. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. 1977).   
27. Glenn Pasanen, Analysis: The Bloomberg Fiscal Legacy, GOTHAM 
GAZETTE (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/opinion/ 
4739-the-bloomberg-fiscal-legacy. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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lacked the power to raise taxes on city residents.28  This was 
because the City’s taxing authority,29 with few exceptions such 
as property taxes, is subject to approval by the legislature and 
the governor.30  Therefore, notwithstanding the mayor and City 
Council’s agreement on the need for increased taxes to meet the 
City’s post-September 11th financial challenges, the City was 
expressly preempted from doing so because the power to tax is 
explicitly reserved to the State.31  Eventually, with Albany’s 
approval, the City was able to implement a package of property, 
 
28. Id. 
29. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
30. See id. art. XVI, § 1.  See also Expedia, Inc. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of 
Fin., 3 N.E.3d 121, 124-25 (N.Y. 2013) (“In New York, local governments lack 
an independent power to tax. The State Constitution vests the taxing power in 
the state legislature and authorizes the legislature to delegate that power to 
local governments.” (internal citations omitted)).  Conversely, the State can 
eliminate a City tax without the City’s consent, as it did with the City’s 
controversial “commuter tax.” See City of New York v. State (Commuter Tax), 
730 N.E.2d 920, 926-27 (N.Y. 2000).  In Commuter Tax, the New York Court of 
Appeals unanimously upheld the State’s elimination of the City’s previously 
imposed tax on commuters on state law grounds.  Id.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that the repeal was “concededly a special law applying only to New York City,” 
the court held that the State did not require a Home Rule message in order to 
implement the law eliminating the tax (even though the legislature had 
requested one when the enabling law was initially enacted).  Id. at 925.  The 
court’s reasoning was twofold: it explained that “[t]he power to tax, of course, 
rests solely with the Legislature,” and further that the State maintained a 
substantial interest in regulating a tax policy affecting hundreds of thousands 
of state residents who worked, but did not live, in the city.  Id. at 925-26.  
Without opining on the political motivations behind the repeal, these findings 
were sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that a Home Rule message 
was not required to repeal the previously imposed tax.  Id. at 926. 
31. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.  A post-Bloomberg decision highlights 
the constraints placed on local governments in the wake of the State’s taxing 
authority.  N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y. 
City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene (Sugary Drinks), 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 
2014).  In Sugary Drinks, the City Board of Health, at Mayor Bloomberg’s 
urging, promulgated an amendment to the City Health Code prohibiting food 
service establishments in the city from serving certain drinks in sizes larger 
than 16 ounces (the “Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule” or “Rule”).  Id. at 541.  
This regulation was the preferred alternative to a “soda tax,” since a tax, rather 
than a size limit, would require state approval.  However, even this approach 
was ultimately found impermissible after a coalition of interest groups 
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap 
Rule.  Id. at 549.  The New York Court of Appeals ruled the regulation invalid, 
holding that, in imposing the Rule, the City Board of Health had exceeded the 
scope of its regulatory authority and infringed on the legislative powers of the 
City Council.  Id. 
7
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personal income and sales tax increases that amounted to 
roughly three billion dollars in additional revenues for the 
City.32 
In a similar example of express preemption, Mayor 
Bloomberg had vigorously campaigned on the promise of 
reforming the City’s deteriorating public education system.33  
Again, the City Council was largely in agreement with the 
mayor’s plan to increase local control of the city schools.34  
However, similar to its taxing power, the City’s authority in the 
education arena is expressly limited by the New York State 
Constitution (specifically article XI, section 1), which places the 
maintenance and support of the State’s public schools solely 
within the province of the State.35  Therefore, the mayor once 
again found the City expressly preempted from taking control of 
its public schools.  Fortunately, the mayor was able to persuade 
the legislature to grant his administration broader control over 
the City’s public school system than the previous 
administration.36  This authority, known as mayoral control, 
allowed the mayor to make decisions, without seeking state 
legislative approval, directly affecting the City’s public school 
system, such as appointing members to the New York City 
Board of Education, hiring or firing the city schools chancellors, 
and closing failing schools.37  As events during the de Blasio 
Administration highlight, this debate over mayoral control 
continues.38 
 
32. Pasanen, supra note 27.   
33. See Seven Years of Mayoral Control, GOTHAM GAZETTE [hereinafter 
Seven Years], http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/archives/377-seven-
years-of-mayoral-control (last visited Sept. 23, 2017). 
34. Id. 
35. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
36. Seven Years, supra note 33. 
37. Id. 
38. Id.  Although Mayor de Blasio had initially requested a seven-year 
extension of mayoral control, the legislature has only agreed, after contentious 
debate on three separate occasions, to two one-year extensions and one two-
year extension.  See Kate Taylor, De Blasio Keeps Control of City’s 
Schools, but Only for a Year, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/nyregion/de-blasio-keeps-control-
of-citys-schools-but-only-for-a-year.html; Jesse McKinley & Lisa W. Foderaro, 
Assembly Approves 2-Year Deal on Mayoral Control of New York City 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/nyr
egion/potential-deal-in-albany-on-mayoral-control-of-schools.html?_r=0.  See 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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Another example of express preemption can be found in 
Mayor Bloomberg’s effort to reduce traffic in the city, while 
simultaneously addressing the City’s future environmental 
sustainability.  The mayor sought to introduce a congestion 
pricing system that would impose a fee on drivers entering and 
leaving Manhattan’s central business district during peak 
hours.39  However, because the City had pursued federal funding 
for the program, it needed the legislature to grant it pricing 
authority and agree to implement the program within a two-year 
period—both pre-requisites to receiving the federal funds.40  
Despite support from the legislature’s Traffic Congestion 
Mitigation Commission, the City Council, then-Governor 
Paterson and a broad coalition of advocacy groups, the 
legislature failed to vote on the plan before the deadline for 
federal funding expired.41 
There is a plausible argument that if federal funds had not 
been involved, the City had the authority to impose fees on city 
drivers, like congestion pricing, even without the legislature’s 
approval.42  Section 1642(a)(4) of the New York Vehicle and 
Traffic Law (“VTL”) provides that cities with over one million 
residents (i.e., the City) may impose “tolls, taxes, [and] fees . . . 
for the use of the highway or any of its parts, where the 
 
also Elizabeth A. Harris, Chancellor Praises de Blasio’s Education Gains as 
Debate to Control Schools Nears, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/nyregion/carmen-farina-bill-de-blasio-
public-school-control.html?_r=0. 
39. See Gail Robinson, Breaking the Gridlock on Congestion Pricing, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/t
ransportation/3922-breaking-the-gridlock-on-congestion-pricing. 
40. Id. 
41. New York City Congestion Pricing Program Case Study, NATIONAL 
COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM 5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.transp
ortation-finance.org/pdf/featured_documents/nchrp_20_24_62_nyc.pdf. 
42. This position is currently being advanced by groups, such as Move NY, 
which has recently proposed a $2.75 congestion pricing fee on cars entering 
Manhattan’s central business zone during peak hours.  See Paul Berger, 
Proposal for Congestion Charge on New York City Motorists, WALL ST. J. (June 
4, 2017, 7:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/article_email/proposal-for-congestion-
charge-on-new-york-city-motorists-1496581200-lMyQjAxMTE3MDA2NTYwO 
TUzWj.; Roderick M. Hills, NYC Doesn’t Need Albany’s Permission to 
Enact Congestion Pricing, STREETSBLOG NYC (July 16, 2012), 
http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/07/16/nyc-doesnt-need-albanys- permission- to-
enact-congestion-pricing. 
9
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imposition thereof is authorized by law.”43  This provision has 
been understood by some to mean that the City may impose fees 
on drivers’ use of city streets only when these fees are authorized 
by a separate state law.  However, construing VTL section 
1642(a)(4) to authorize fees only when some other state statute 
also authorizes such fees would render the italicized section 
redundant and meaningless.  A more reasonable reading of the 
provision would hold that the City is authorized to impose fees 
on city drivers as long as these fees are authorized by either state 
or local law.44 
 
 B. Implied Preemption 
 
In addition to the express preemption examples, where the 
Home Rule answers were so clear it would have been futile to 
litigate them, there are a number of implied preemption cases 
that were litigated during the Bloomberg Era, such as those 
discussed below, which highlight the lack of clarity in the Home 
Rule law as it exists today. 
 
The “Peace Officers” Case 
 
The first case involving Home Rule litigated by the Law 
Department after Mayor Bloomberg’s election was a holdover 
from the Giuliani Administration.  In New York City Health and 
Hospitals Corp. v. Council of New York, the New York City 
Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”) had sued the City 
Council seeking to invalidate Local Law 16 of 2001 that 
mandated that city-funded hospitals utilize peace officers as 
 
43. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1642(a)(4) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
44. As another example of state control, the VTL also governs city traffic 
control initiatives and violation-monitoring systems.  Almost thirty years ago, 
the legislature enacted VTL § 1111-a which permitted the installation of red 
light cameras in cities with a population of one million or more (i.e. the City).  
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1111-a (McKinney 2011).  The City then used this 
authorization to launch the nation’s first Red Light Camera program.  See N.Y. 
CITY DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY RED LIGHT CAMERA PROGRAM: PROGRAM 
REVIEW 1994-2015 at 2 (2016).  Since 1994, the legislature has extended the 
duration of the City’s program seven times.  Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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security guards.45  In an effort to preserve resources, HHC had 
begun to replace peace officers with private security guards (who 
lacked peace officer status and who were paid a lower salary).46  
Employing its broad police power with regard to the public 
welfare,47 and maintaining that the law would promote the 
safety of patients, staff, and visitors of the City’s hospitals, the 
City Council enacted Local Law 16 over then-Mayor Giuliani’s 
veto.48  HHC then challenged the city legislation, arguing that it 
conflicted with, and was preempted by, the HHC Act—the state 
law that governs HHC.49  The City and the affected union, Local 
237, subsequently intervened as plaintiff and defendant, 
respectively.50 
The First Department held the law preempted, finding that 
through the HHC Act, “the Legislature [had] both impliedly and 
expressly evinced an intent to preempt” the area of the City’s 
hospital system.51  More specifically, the court determined that 
the local law was inconsistent with the HHC Act’s provisions 
affording HHC complete autonomy over personnel qualifications 
and outsourcing, and that the State had demonstrated an intent 
to preempt the entire health care field thereby precluding any 
further local regulation.52  The court also noted that the law did 
not fall within the narrow preemption exception, which allows 
for “‘generally applicable’ local laws that only ‘incidentally 
infringe’ upon the powers of state created entities.”53  Here, the 
court explained, the local law was not one of general 
applicability since it applied only to HHC’s facilities and not to 
all of the City’s hospitals.  Further, the enactment had more 
than a tangential or incidental impact because it affected only 
security guards who were not health care personnel and 
 
45. See N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Council of N.Y. (Peace Officers), 
752 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667-68 (App. Div. 2003). 
46. Id. at 667. 
47. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2011); N.Y.C. Charter 
ch. 2, § 28. 
48. Peace Officers, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 667. 
49. Id. at 668. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 671. 
52. Id. at 671-72.  
53. Peace Officers, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 673.  
11
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intruded on HHC’s autonomy concerning personnel decisions.54  
While the court’s decision was essentially later nullified by a 
2003 state law requiring peace officers to perform security 
functions at HHC facilities,55 the court’s analysis demonstrated 
its deference to state preemption—a proclivity that would recur 
in the administration’s subsequent legal clashes with the City 
Council. 
 
The “Predatory Lending” Case 
 
Mayor Bloomberg again prevailed over the City Council the 
following year in Mayor of New York v. Council of New York 
(“Predatory Lending”).56  In Predatory Lending, the mayor 
challenged the validity of a local law, passed over his veto, 
prohibiting city agencies from doing business with, depositing 
funds with, or providing financial assistance to, financial 
institutions that engaged in “predatory” lending practices.57  The 
Predatory Lending Court declared the law void on both conflict 
and field preemption grounds.58  The court found provisions of 
the local ordinance to be “in substantial conflict” with the state 
banking law, with the potential to “disrupt the operation” of the 
state statute.59  In addition, the court explained, the state 
banking law “contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme” that 
provides “uniform regulation of the residential mortgage lending 
process.”60  In the court’s view, this was sufficient to manifest 
the legislature’s intent to occupy the entire field of financial 
lending.61  Therefore, the City Council’s contention that the law 
was permissive because the legislature failed to include express 
preemption language in the law proved unavailing; the 
exhaustive provisions of the state statute evinced the State’s 
desire to preclude local legislation in the predatory lending 
 
54. Id. at 673-74.  
55. Act of October 15, 2003, ch. 671, 2003 N.Y. Laws 671 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 2003)). 
56. Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y. (Predatory Lending), 780 N.Y.S.2d 
266 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
57. See id. at 269. 
58. See id. at 273-74. 
59. Id. at 275. 
60. Id. at 273-74. 
61. See Predatory Lending, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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arena.62 
 
The “Domestic Partners” Case 
 
In Council of New York v. Bloomberg (“Domestic Partners”), 
another preemption case, the court of appeals, by a four to three 
vote, again ruled in the mayor’s favor.63  The dispute arose from 
the City Council’s 2004 passage over the mayor’s veto of an equal 
benefits law (“EBL”) that prohibited city agencies from 
contracting with businesses that failed to provide its employees’ 
domestic partners with employment benefits equal to those of 
employees’ spouses.64  The mayor initially filed a declaratory 
judgment action, asserting that the EBL was preempted by both 
state law requiring government agencies to engage in 
competitive bidding practices and federal law prescribing the 
terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
benefit plans.65  When the mayor’s application for a temporary 
restraining order was denied, he declared that he would not 
enforce the EBL until its validity had been decided, citing his 
right and duty not to execute unlawful ordinances.66  In 
response, the City Council commenced an Article 78 proceeding 
to compel the mayor to enforce the EBL.  The supreme court 
granted the City Council’s petition, relying on what the court 
deemed “the presumption of validity.”67  The appellate division, 
however, unanimously reversed and the court of appeals 
affirmed.68 
In sustaining the mayor’s actions, the state’s highest court 
first explained that the validity of the EBL could be raised as a 
defense by the mayor in an Article 78 proceeding and that he 
had acted properly in refusing to enforce a law he believed 
invalid.69  On the question of Home Rule, the Domestic Partners 
 
62. See id. at 274-75.  
63. Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg (Domestic Partners), 846 N.E.2d 433 
(N.Y. 2006). 
64. Id. at 435. 
65. Id. at 435-46. 
66. Id. at 436. 
67. Id. 
68. See Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 435-37.  
69. See id. at 436.  
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Court held that despite the City Council’s social policy 
intentions, the EBL would violate the purpose of the state’s 
competitive bidding statute.70  By way of example, the court 
pointed out that contract specifications could be drafted in such 
a manner as to favor contractors who provided particular 
benefits to its employees (e.g., for domestic partners).71  The 
court found this potential outcome undermined the purpose of 
the state’s competitive bidding statute, which was to save 
municipalities money as well as “to prevent ‘favoritism, 
improvidence, fraud and corruption in the awarding of public 
contracts.’”72  While acknowledging that local governments 
maintain the power to legislate in the area of employee welfare 
and safety,73 the court noted that this power is curtailed by 
contrary state legislation—the state’s competitive bidding 
statute is one such law.74  Thus, once again, a local law was 
struck down on preemption grounds. 
 
The “Uniformed Service Members” Case 
 
In 2007, the mayor’s win streak in suits against the City 
Council came to an end.  The case involved the validity of 
legislation passed over former Mayor Giuliani’s veto that gave 
the New York City Fire Department’s alarm dispatchers and 
emergency medical technicians the status of uniformed fire 
service members for collective bargaining purposes.75  The 
former mayor had sued to have the law declared invalid,76 
arguing that the local law was preempted by the state’s Taylor 
Law governing public sector labor relations.77  In affirming the 
 
70. See id. at 439.  
71. See id. at 438. 
72. Id. at 438 (quoting In re N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 185, 190 
(N.Y. 1996)).   
73. Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 439-40.  Specifically, for those 
individuals performing work, labor, or services for the municipality.  See N.Y. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(9); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 10(1)(ii)(a)(10). 
74. Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 440 (“[w]here the two conflict, as 
they do here, the legislative restriction on the municipality’s power prevails.”).   
75. Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y. (Uniformed Service Members), 874 
N.E.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. 2007). 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 710.  
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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lower courts, the court of appeals held that the local law was not 
preempted, finding that localities were permitted to exercise 
discretion regarding the procedures by which bargaining units 
are determined, meaning the local law was consistent with—and 
not preempted by—the Taylor Law.78 
Although the administration was largely successful in 
litigating these implied preemption cases,79 each highlight 
considerable uncertainty surrounding whether a particular local 
law is, or is not, preempted.  The cases reviewed above illustrate 
that relying on the courts rather than the legislature to 
determine the legislature’s preemptive intent can be 
problematic.  In the absence of an explicit declaration by the 
legislature, asking the courts to resolve the preemption issue has 
frequently resulted in a presumption in favor of preemption in 
the Home Rule context.80  In the concluding section of this 
article, we discuss the benefits of imposing a greater burden on 
the legislature to demonstrate its intent to preempt local 
legislation.  Imposing such a burden would, we believe, simplify 
 
78. See id. at 709-10.  The court also determined that the City Council did 
not require a referendum to enact the local law since it did not improperly 
encroach on the mayor’s role in city government.  Id. at 711.  Generally, a 
referendum is required for legislation that “curtails any power of an elective 
officer.”  N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 23(2)(f) (McKinney 1994).   
79. While decided after Mayor Bloomberg left office, Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York 
(Discriminatory Policing), 35 N.Y.S.3d 314 (App. Div. 2016) also involved 
implied preemption issues in the context of Home Rule.  In Discriminatory 
Policing, the City Council enacted a local law over Mayor Bloomberg’s veto 
which provided a civil cause of action to individuals who claimed to have been 
subject to discriminatory law enforcement practices by the City.  Id. at 316-17.  
Unions representing the City’s police officers and sergeants challenged the law 
as preempted by the state’s Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”).  Id. at 317.  The 
court of appeals upheld the law, finding it to be one of anti-discrimination and 
not criminal procedure (and thus not preempted by the CPL), and also 
determined that there was no conflict with state law.  Id. at 319-20.   
80. This has caused some scholars to argue for a judicial presumption 
against preemption.  For instance, Professor Roderick Hills has posited that 
because the Home Rule powers are to be “liberally construed,” this requires “a 
qualified presumption against preemption: Unless statutory text manifestly 
and unambiguously supersedes local law, courts should presume that state law 
does not preempt local laws.  [But the presumption] can be overcome where 
local laws encroach on some substantial state interest that local residents are 
likely to ignore.”  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: 
Defending and Defining an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction 
in New York, 77 ALB. L. REV. 647, 648 (2014). 
15
CARDOZO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  10:08 PM 
2017 HOME RULE IN NEW YORK 105 
the preemption analysis, give somewhat more authority to local 
governments, and provide more clarity to both localities and the 
State. 
 
 C. Substantial State Concern 
 
In addition to preemption, the substantial state concern 
doctrine played a major role in the Home Rule issues litigated 
during the Bloomberg Administration.  Before discussing those 
cases, it is important to first discuss a court of appeals decision 
pre-dating the Bloomberg Era, which foreshadowed issues the 
administration would face in the Home Rule context and helped 
shape the strategy the Law Department would employ to 
advance the Bloomberg Agenda. 
 
“PBA I” and “PBA II” 
 
In City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of 
the City of New York, Inc. (“PBA I”)81 the City brought a 
declaratory judgment action challenging a state law82 which 
provided the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) 
exclusive jurisdiction over negotiation impasses between the city 
police and firefighter unions and the City.83  The dispute arose 
out of legislation, passed at the behest of the Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association (“PBA,”)84 which shifted jurisdiction 
over resolving such impasses from the locally-created city Board 
of Collective Bargaining (“BCB”) to the state-created PERB.85  In 
 
81. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of the City of 
N.Y. Inc. (PBA I), 676 N.E.2d 847, 849 (N.Y. 1996).  
82. Act of February 12, 1996, ch. 13, 1996 N.Y. Laws 50. 
83. PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 848. 
84. The PBA believed PERB to be a more favorable forum at the time.  See 
id. at 849. After voting in favor of the law, the legislature was forced to override 
then-Governor Pataki’s veto in order for the law to take effect.  Id. 
85. See id. at 849.  PERB was created under the Taylor Law to facilitate 
the resolution of labor disputes between public employers and employees.  Id. 
at 848.  The Taylor Law also allows municipalities to create local bodies, often 
referred to as mini-PERBs, to resolve disagreements.  Id.  Although at one time 
there were as many as thirty-five mini-PERBs, as of 2011, the BCB was one of 
only four remaining in the state.  See Jurisdiction to Resolve an Impasse in 
Collective Bargaining Under the Taylor Law, N.Y. PUB. PERSONNEL LAW (Aug. 
11, 2011), https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011/08/jurisdiction-to-
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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upholding both the trial court and the appellate division, the 
court of appeals found the state statute unconstitutional because 
“this ‘special law,’ which relate[d] to the ‘property, affairs, or 
government’ of New York City, was not enacted to further a 
matter of ‘sufficient importance to the State generally’ [such 
that] its enactment without a home rule message from New York 
City render[ed] the chapter law unconstitutional and 
unenforceable.”86 
In a dramatic lesson as to how the State could 
constitutionally pass close to identical legislation, the 
legislature, two years later, passed another law setting out 
practically the same terms but curing the constitutional defects 
of the previously overturned law.87  In contrast to the earlier 
legislation, the revised law, Chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998, 
extended PERB’s jurisdiction to all police and firefighter unions 
in the state.88  After negotiations stalled in the collective 
bargaining between the City and PBA in 2000 (the first 
collective bargaining since the enactment of the new law), the 
City sued to have that law declared unconstitutional.89  The law 
was a special law, the City argued, in violation of the Home Rule 
provisions because it “singl[ed] out the City of New York and its 
three neighboring counties by establishing a new system for 
them totally at odds with the rest of the State.”90  The appellate 
division, affirming the supreme court, upheld the new law 
finding it to be a general law of statewide application, which 
therefore did not require a Home Rule message as a precondition 
for its enactment.91  The court of appeals also affirmed, although 
on different grounds, holding that: 
[B]ecause chapter 641 is a “special law” that 
serves a substantial State concern, the home rule 
requirements were not implicated and thus the 
statute is constitutional and enforceable even 
 
resolve-impasse-in.html. 
86. See PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 848 (internal citations omitted).   
87. See Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. City of New York (PBA 
II), 767 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 2001). 
88. Act of December 18, 1998, ch. 13, 1996 N.Y. Laws 641. 
89. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 119. 
90. Id. at 119.  
91. See id. at 119. 
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absent a home rule message.  We further hold that 
once a police or fire union opts to seek impasse 
resolution by PERB and PERB declares an 
impasse, chapter 641 gives PERB exclusive 
jurisdiction to resolve such an impasse.92 
Notably, while the court “agree[ed] with the courts below that by 
its terms, chapter 641 applie[d] to all local governments,” it 
explained that since the City and three surrounding suburbs 
were the only affected localities, “the actual effect of chapter 641 
[was] a restriction targeted at [the] four localities,” which 
continued to exercise the preexisting local option that, but for 
the challenged law, permitted the creation of mini-PERBs to 
address collective bargaining impasses.93  As such, Chapter 641 
was declared a special law and not a general law.94 Nonetheless, 
a Home Rule message was not required because the legislature 
“expressly stat[ed] the substantial State concern sought to be 
addressed [by Chapter 641] and ensur[ed] that the legislation 
[was] rationally related to that concern.”95 
Despite the court of appeals’ substantial effort to 
demonstrate consistency in its decision-making, PBA I and PBA 
II illustrate the ease with which an apparent Home Rule 
violation can be reframed as one of substantial state concern.  By 
inserting a purported state interest into a piece of state 
legislation previously found illegal because it only dealt with a 
single local entity, and ensuring that the law was “rationally 
related” to that stated purpose, the legislature had—and 
continues to enjoy—tremendous flexibility in avoiding the Home 
Rule requirements.  Including such language in a proposed law 
is a fairly simple drafting task and constitutional scholars would 
likely agree that setting out a “rational relationship” is relatively 
easy to accomplish.  In these cases, two virtually identical laws 
 
92. Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. at 121.   
94. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 124. 
95. Id. at 122.  The court explained that Chapter 641 is intended “to foster 
[the] ‘orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and 
fire bargaining units . . . to enhance public safety and prevent the loss or 
interruption of vital public services,’” and determined that “fulfillment of this 
legislative purpose is rationally served by chapter 641, which mandates that 
all local governments allow their police and fire unions access to PERB impasse 
procedures in resolving public sector labor disputes.”  Id. at 122. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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resulted in two very different constitutional determinations 
even though both sought identical outcomes. 
An optimistic assessment would maintain that this type of 
legal analysis forces the legislature to be clear about the 
intended state purpose of the proposed legislation and to tailor 
it in such a way as to actually further that identified state 
interest.  A more pessimistic analysis would be that merely 
introducing state concern language into a law’s preamble—even 
if merely pretextual—results in a court deferring to the 
legislature and finding a substantial state concern even when 
one was not intended.  This problem is compounded by the fact 
that “[i]n determining a substantial State concern, [the court] 
‘rel[ies] upon the stated purpose and legislative history of the act 
in question’ . . . as the Supreme Court aptly noted, the ‘wisdom 
of that determination is not for court review here.’”96  Regardless 
of these diverging points of view, the teachings of PBA I and PBA 
II would become particularly clear in the most publicized Home 
Rule case litigated during the Bloomberg Administration—the 
“Green Cabs” case.97 
 
The “Green Cabs” Case 
 
Seeing a need to increase the availability of taxis (i.e., yellow 
taxis and livery service vehicles) in certain underserved areas of 
the city (particularly northern Manhattan and the outer 
boroughs), and stymied by the City Council’s refusal to issue a 
Home Rule message that would allow passage of local legislation 
dealing with the issue, Mayor Bloomberg turned to the state 
legislature to pass the HAIL Act.98  The HAIL Act allowed for 
the sale of eighteen thousand new medallions for livery vehicles 
to pick up curbside passengers in those underserved areas, and 
another two thousand medallions for wheelchair-accessible 
yellow taxis.99  The Act was projected to generate over one billion 
 
96. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 122. 
97. Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State (Green Cabs), 993 N.E.2d 393, 400 
(N.Y. 2013). 
98. Hail Accessible Inter-borough License Act, ch. 602, § 1, 2011 N.Y. Sess. 
Laws (McKinney) [hereinafter HAIL Act]. 
99. See Green Cabs, 993 N.E.2d at 398.  The medallions were to be 
distributed in increments of six thousand over a three-year period.  One-fifth 
19
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in revenue for the City.100  A group of medallion owners, in 
alignment with members of the City Council and then public 
advocate and future Mayor Bill de Blasio, challenged the Act as 
violative of the Home Rule and other provisions of the state 
constitution.101 
After the lower court had ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, the 
state’s highest court, on direct appeal, reversed.102  The court 
upheld the constitutionality of the law because it was designed 
to further a substantial state concern—namely, improved access 
to street-hail transportation throughout the five boroughs103 
(and, in particular, for disabled individuals and those who reside 
or work in areas outside of Manhattan’s central business 
district).  Judge Pigott, on behalf of a unanimous court, wrote: 
We conclude that the HAIL Act addresses a 
matter of substantial state concern.  This is not a 
purely local issue.  Millions of people from within 
and without the State visit the City annually.  
Some of these visitors are disabled, and will 
undoubtably [sic] benefit from the increase in 
accessible vehicles in the Manhattan central 
business district and in the outer boroughs.  The 
Act is for the benefit of all New Yorkers, and not 
merely those residing within the City.  Efficient 
transportation service in the State’s largest city 
and international center of commerce is important 
to the entire State.  The Act plainly furthers all of 
these significant goals.104 
Similar to PBA I and PBA II, the Green Cabs Court pointed 
to the HAIL Act’s preamble to support its interpretation of the 
 
of the first six thousand vehicles would need to be handicap-accessible.  Id. at 
398.  The remaining twelve thousand would also be subject to the twenty 
percent accessibility requirement unless a different percentage was 
recommended by the Taxi and Limousine Commission after investigation.  Id. 
at 399. 
100. Michael M. Grynbaum, Deal Struck to Broaden Taxi Service in the 
City, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/nyregio
n/deal-is-struck-to-broaden-taxi-service-in-new-york-city.html. 
101. See Green Cabs, 993 N.E.2d at 399.  
102. Id. at 405. 
103. Id. at 401.  
104. Id. at 401. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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Act as one that furthered a substantial state interest.105  The 
opinion suggests that the legislature had anticipated the 
plaintiffs’ challenge, as the Act’s preamble clearly states “that 
the public health, safety and welfare of the residents of the state 
of New York traveling to, from, and within the city of New York 
is a matter of substantial state concern, including access to safe 
and reliable mass transportation such as taxicabs.”106  The court 
neither confronted this statement nor did it explain why the 
purported state concern was actually substantial.  Instead, as in 
PBA II, the court merely endorsed the legislature’s position and 
used it to support its conclusion; again, implying that 
legislation’s mere articulation of a state concern and a rational 
relationship are sufficient for the State to intrude in local affairs. 
 
IV. The Home Rule Problem and How It Should Be Solved 
 
 A. Background 
 
Under our federal system, the federal government may only 
act consistently with the specific powers enumerated in the 
Federal Constitution.  While the Supremacy Clause ensures that 
the Federal Constitution and federal laws generally take 
precedence over state constitutions and state laws,107 the federal 
government and those of the fifty states share power in countless 
ways.108  By contrast, the localities in each of the fifty states exist 
solely because the State allows them to exist.  It is the State that 
sets the geographic boundaries of the localities and prescribes 
their powers.  In New York, this means that a locality may only 
adopt a law that is not inconsistent with the state constitution 
or any state general law when that local law is either (i) related 
to its property, affairs or government;109 (ii) listed in the bill of 
 
105. Id.  
106. HAIL Act, ch. 602, § 1. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
108. These shared powers are referred to as concurrent powers.  See 
Robert Longley, Federalism: A Government System of Shared Powers, 
THOUGHT CO. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/federalism-powers-
national-and-state-governments-3321841.   
109. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(i).  
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rights;110 (iii) listed in article IX as an additional power (i.e., one 
not related to a locality’s property, affairs or government) unless 
restricted by the State;111 (iv) granted by the statute of local 
governments112 or the Municipal Home Rule Law;113 or (v) 
conferred by the State as an additional power (i.e., one not 
related to a locality’s property affairs or government, and in 
addition to those listed above).  Most of these laws can always be 
nullified or restricted by subsequent state legislation.114 
Given this dynamic, some commentators have questioned 
whether the arguments advanced by the Law Department in the 
cases discussed above were in the long-term best interests of the 
City.115  They contend that by emphasizing preemption and state 
 
110. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  
111. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii).   
112. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV. § 10 (McKinney 1994) (enacted pursuant to 
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2). 
113. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1994). 
114. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(3). 
115. See Richard Briffault, Bloomberg’s Legal Legacy – Closing Remarks, 
CITY SQUARE (Dec. 4, 2012), http://urbanlawjournal.com/bloomberg-
symposium-closing-remarks/ (closing remarks at the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal Symposium: Bloomberg’s Legal Legacy).  The speaker commented:  
[A] particularly striking feature of the Bloomberg 
Administration’s approach to home rule (although it is one 
shared with the Giuliani Administration) . . . is the attempt 
to blunt home rule by invoking state law, and on at least one 
occasion actually securing a state law, to limit the scope of 
the City’s legal authority. 
      . . . .  
      . . . [A]s a teacher of local government law, and a believer 
in the importance of home rule, I find it a little unsettling 
when New York City’s Mayor argues before the state courts 
that a state law preempts a City initiative.  It is even more 
unsettling when, in order to win a policy dispute, the Mayor 
asks the state to turn what had long been a field of City 
regulation into a matter of state concern and a subject for 
state legislative determination.  Once a state has taken over 
a subject, it may be hard for the City - and for future Mayors 
- to get it back.  Perhaps naively, I think the Mayor ought to 
be fighting to expand City power, not seeking laws and court 
rulings that would limit it. 
Id.  See also Roberta A. Kaplan & Jacob H. Hupart, Can New York City Govern 
Itself? The Incongruity of the Court of Appeals’ Recent Cases Regarding 
Regulation of New York City by New York City, 78 ALB. L. REV. 105, 109 (2015). 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/7
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interest to further the administration’s more immediate agenda, 
the Law Department may have compromised future local 
authority.116  However, even critics would likely agree that 
crafting creative arguments and invoking persuasive precedent 
to achieve the desired outcome for one’s client is the goal and 
obligation of any lawyer.  Many of the cases discussed above, 
such as Green Cabs, involved important and long desired social 
initiatives.  A lawyer for the government should certainly advise 
the mayor of the potential long-term downsides of taking a 
particular legal position that might create a troublesome 
precedent.  However, if the client decides that he or she wants 
to push forward because of the importance of the proposed 
legislation, a responsible lawyer cannot avoid making those 
arguments because of a theoretical concern that the precedent 
established might, at some indeterminable time in the future, be 
cited against the client.117 
In any event, the discussion above clearly illustrates the 
significant problems with the manner in which the Home Rule 
 
“Similarly, another commentator noted that ‘[j]udicial acceptance of the lack of 
need for such a home rule message might weaken the city’s long-term interest 
in resisting interference from future state legislatures in the operations of New 
York City, to the dismay of future mayors and corporation counsels.’” Id.  
116. See Briffault, supra note 115. 
Court decisions reading state laws broadly to occupy a field 
and bar local regulation or that treat local additions to or 
departures from state law as in conflict with local measures 
become precedents for future challenges to City laws which 
can wind up curbing future Mayors.  There may be a conflict 
here between the immediate political and policy needs of any 
mayoral administration, with a willingness to use whatever 
legal tools are at hand, including state preemption, to 
advance its goals, and the long-term interest of the City in 
being able to chart its own destiny with less interference from 
the state. 
Id.  See also Roberta A. Kaplan, New York City Taxis and the New York State 
Legislature: What is Left of the State Constitution’s Home Rule Clause After the 
Court of Appeals Decision in the HAIL Act Case?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 113, 115-16 
(2014) (“[i]n a move that challengers to the law characterized as ‘“an end-run”’ 
around constitutional safeguards,’ Mayor Bloomberg instead urged the New 
York State Legislature to pass the [HAIL Act].”) [hereinafter Home Rule After 
the Hail Act Decision].  
117. Michael A. Cardozo, The Conflicting Ethical, Legal, and Public Policy 
Obligations of the Government’s Chief Legal Officer, 22 PROF. LAW. 4, 5-6 
(2014).  
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provisions are interpreted today.  Highlighting that issue is the 
legislature’s recent passage of a bill to halt the implementation 
of the City’s “bag tax.”118  The bill was a direct response to the 
City Council’s passage—intended to reduce the use of carryout 
bags as part of a broader effort to address the City’s 
environmental concerns—of a law, which, with limited 
exceptions, imposed a five-cent fee on the use of plastic or paper 
bags at retail, convenience, and grocery stores.119  In response, 
the recent state law prohibits “any local law or ordinance, or any 
rule or regulation, by a city with a population of one million or 
more, related to charging a fee for carryout merchandise bags 
(‘carryout bags’) or a fee of similar effect.”120  While the 
legislation does not explicitly refer to the City, its intended 
application is clear—there are no other municipalities in New 
York with more than one million people.121  In fact, other 
localities, including Suffolk County and parts of Westchester, 
have similar bag tax laws which are not prohibited by the state 
legislation.122 
Given the targeted nature of the bill, it would seem to be a 
special law, which would require a Home Rule message from the 
City in order to take effect.  Since there was no such request from 
the City, the state law, on its face, appears unconstitutional.  
 
118. See S. 4158, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (opposing 
implementation of 2016 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 63).  Notwithstanding the 
preferred terminology of the bill’s sponsors, the five-cent charge is not a tax 
but rather a fee since the funds are earmarked for store owners and not the 
government.  Some, like Governor Cuomo, have suggested that the fee would 
be more appropriate as a statewide tax so that the government could direct the 
funds to support environmental welfare initiatives.  See Jesse McKinley, 
Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-city-
plastic-bag-law.html?_r=0.  Because the City cannot impose a tax without the 
legislature’s approval, the City, to avoid having to ask the legislature for 
permission to impose a bag tax, instead proved that users of plastic bags would 
pay a fee to the store owners.  See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 8-11. 
119. See 2016 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 63. 
120. S. 4158, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).  
121. New York Cities by Population, NEW YORK DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT, 
http://www.newyork-demographics.com/cities_by_population (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017). 
122. See S. Walter Packaging, New York – Bag Legislation, BAGLAWS.COM, 
http://www.baglaws.com/legislation.php?state=New+York (last visited Sept. 4, 
2017). 
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However, because the bill technically refers to an “open class” of 
municipalities (i.e., any and all cities with a population of one 
million people or more), it would likely survive constitutional 
challenge. Indeed, similar “classification” laws have long been 
upheld by the courts.123 
But should the legislature be so readily able to override a 
local law that was validly enacted and impacts only the locality 
itself?  That was the question posed by Senator Liz Krueger in 
opposition to the legislature’s bill eliminating the “bag tax”124 
and one that lies at the heart of the Home Rule debate. 
When the present Home Rule provisions were adopted more 
than fifty years ago, they were heralded as “strengthen[ing] the 
governments closest to the people.”125  Given the manner in 
which those provisions have been interpreted, that goal clearly 
has not been met.  Certainly, it would seem that those city 
representatives, not persons elected from localities throughout 
the entire state, should be able to decide whether to allow the 
use of plastic bags, or how disputes with their unions should be 
resolved, or whether red light cameras to apprehend speeding 
drivers on city streets should be installed.126  In addition, local 
legislatures should not be left to guess whether, under the guise 
of “implied preemption,” a court will determine that the local 
legislature lacks the power to legislate in a particular area, such 
as safety for a public hospital, or the rules to be followed when 
entering into a municipal contract. 
 
123. See, e.g., Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1956) 
(upholding classification by counties based on populations of one hundred 
thousand); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Res. of N.Y., 385 N.E.2d 1284, 
1290-92 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that an act allowing tax and condemnation rights 
through a set of criteria only applying, in effect, to the Museum of Modern Art 
was a general law because, in the future, the criteria could possibly apply to 
other similar institutions).  
124. Liz Krueger, Statement from Senator Krueger on Governor Signing 
Plastic Bag Preemption Bill, N.Y. ST. SENATE (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/liz-krueger/statement-
senator-krueger-governor-signing-plastic-bag. 
125. See Ward, supra note 5, at 547.  
126. See generally Danielle Furfaro & Kirstan Conley, Bill for More Speed 
Cameras Stops in Senate, N.Y. POST (June 22, 2017, 1:28 AM) 
http://nypost.com/2017/06/22/legislators-vote-to-double-the-citys-number-of-
speed-cameras/?mc_cid=27966076b1&mc_eid=84a564f8a5 (although the 
assembly voted to nearly double the number of cameras in the City’s speed 
camera program from 140 to 290, the senate failed to vote on the measure). 
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There are clearly important benefits weighing in favor of 
state intervention in certain local affairs.  Cities are, by nature, 
“creatures of the state,” and their authority to self-govern is 
similarly state-derived.127  Municipalities throughout New York, 
particularly upstate, depend on the State to oversee necessities 
like water supply and roadways, and to intervene when local 
measures prove inadequate or conflict with the legitimate 
interests of an adjoining locality.  However, there are also 
important benefits to local control (i.e., Home Rule).  Local 
officials presumably know their constituents best and have their 
finger on the pulse of the needs and concerns of the communities 
they govern.  Instances such as the legislature’s overturning the 
bag tax epitomize why Home Rule in New York has largely 
vanished and has even been referred to as a “ghost.”128 
  As discussed above, preemption has frequently been 
applied by the courts to invalidate local legislation which 
directly conflicts or is otherwise inconsistent with state law.  
This may include subject matter which the State has expressly 
preempted (e.g., by statute) or where such preemption may be 
inferred (e.g., comprehensive state regulation).129  The problem 
with this framework is the uncertainty faced by local 
governments in the face of the State’s position of dominance.  As 
referenced above, a local law may be preempted by state 
legislation if it is found: (i) to place additional restrictions on 
state law or (ii) vary from state procedure.130  This is why the 
court of appeals found the City Council’s enactment of the 
Domestic Partner legislation to be an undue restriction on the 
state’s competitive bidding statute even though the regulation of 
contractors is reserved to municipalities (and notwithstanding 
 
127. See generally 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) (explaining that Dillon’s Rule 
maintains that municipalities only have the powers that are: (1) expressly 
granted to them by the state legislature; (2) necessarily implied or necessarily 
incident to the powers expressly granted; and (3) absolutely essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the municipality–not simply convenient but 
indispensable). 
128. See James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: “The 
Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
129. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 1983) 
(“[t]he intent to pre-empt need not be express.  It is enough that the 
[l]egislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do so.”). 
130. See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905-06 (N.Y. 1987). 
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the absence of an explicit state law to the contrary).131  While 
applying the preemption doctrine may certainly be nuanced at 
times, it is often employed to strike down local laws and has 
consequently undermined the efficacy of Home Rule.  The court 
of appeals conceded as much in observing that “[t]he preemption 
doctrine represents a fundamental limitation on home rule 
powers.”132 
Any solution to these problems by way of constitutional 
amendment of the Home Rule provisions must, therefore, 
address both the preemption and substantial state concern 
doctrines. 
 
 B. Preemption 
 
  To address the preemption problem, the constitution 
should be amended to make clear that local laws should not be 
found preempted unless the language in the particular state law 
makes explicit the legislature’s intent for the state law to be 
controlling.  Not only would this allow localities to act with a 
clearer understanding of whether a proposed local law would be 
found preempted, but it would incentivize clarity in the 
legislature’s lawmaking process.  If the legislature wants to 
ascribe preemptive effect to a particular law or to an entire 
regulatory field, it should be required to make that intention 
abundantly clear in the text of the applicable provision.  This 
would limit instances of preemption to circumstances where 
either the legislature plainly forbade a local enactment or where 
such an enactment would render it impossible to comply with 
analogous state law. 
A constitutional amendment requiring this type of clarity 
would eliminate much of the local uncertainty surrounding 
Home Rule as well as reinvigorate local control.  In Illinois, for 
example, the state constitution affords home rule powers to 
municipalities equivalent to those of the state, unless the state 
law asserts its exclusive authority.133  This structure serves to 
 
131. Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 439-40 (N.Y. 2006). 
132. Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 
(N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). 
133. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).  Similarly, in Alaska, the state’s highest 
court has held that the state legislature cannot occupy a field unless it 
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preserve the state’s power to preempt local law while 
simultaneously supporting local autonomy.134  It also forces the 
state legislature to declare its intent to preempt when it believes 
such to be necessary.135  Further, it undoubtedly limits instances 
where the judiciary might find a local law preempted when the 
state legislature did not so intend.136  Therefore, the proposed 
amended Home Rule provision must clearly state that if a clear 
conflict exists between a local law and state statute containing 
explicit preemption language, the local law should be deemed 
preempted; but if the State’s intent to preempt is not clear, the 
local law should be found valid.  In addition, to avoid the 
possibility that the legislature might then include express 
preemption language in all applicable legislation, the proposed 
amended Home Rule provision should carve out certain areas 
where localities’ Home Rule powers may not be limited or 
denied. 
 
 C. Substantial State Concern 
 
The substantial state concern doctrine must also be dealt 
with through amendment of the constitution’s Home Rule 
language.  As detailed above, while the constitution provides 
that the legislature may not enact a special law concerning the 
“property, affairs or government” of a particular locality without 
first securing the affected locality’s permission via a Home Rule 
message,137 this provision has been weakened considerably by 
courts consistently ruling that this limitation is not applicable 
where the State itself maintains an interest in the subject 
matter of the legislation.138  Since there are few topics today in 
 
explicitly states such an intent.  See Municipality of Anchorage v. Repasky, 34 
P.3d 302, 311 (Alaska 2001) (“[i]n general, for state law to preempt local 
authority, it is not enough for state law to occupy the field.  Rather, ‘if the 
legislature wishes to “preempt” an entire field, [it] must so state.’”). 
134. Richard Briffault, “Mind the Gap” The Promise and Limits of Home 
Rule in New York, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE 
CRISIS AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 161, 174-76 (Peter J. Galie, 
Christopher Bopst, & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016). 
135. Id. at 186-87. 
136. Id.  
137. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). 
138. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929). 
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which the State does not have at least an arguable interest, this 
“exception” has largely become the rule.  While there are 
certainly areas where local and state interests overlap, and at 
times where there may be a legitimate need for state 
intervention with (or even without) local consent, the 
substantial state concern doctrine has almost completely 
eviscerated article IX’s Home Rule protections.139 
To address this circumvention of Home Rule, the 
constitution should be amended to clarify when a Home Rule 
message is not required; that is, to delineate the subject areas 
where the State could act on matters that affect localities 
because they may, in fact, be matters of substantial state 
concern.  Like education and the courts, areas already listed in 
the constitution as ones subject to state control,140 the 
constitution could list additional topics which should 
predominantly, but not necessarily exclusively, lie within the 
State’s purview, including subjects like transportation and the 
environment.  This would provide localities with a measure of 
predictability currently lacking in the Home Rule context as well 
as delineate which areas should be subject to the substantial 
state concern test. 
However, the State’s authority over these enumerated 
subject areas should not be as unfettered as it is for the school 
and judicial systems.  The identified topics of potential state 
concern should be labeled “state interests,” but the State would 
still have to make clear in the particular legislation, and be 
subject to a much more rigorous standard of judicial review than 
has been applied to date, that the specific issue at hand is in fact 
of substantial state concern.  This should be done by including 
language in the constitution (i) requiring a detailed legislative 
finding that the matter constitutes or relates to a specific, 
substantial state interest, and (ii) requiring, in order for the 
preemption to be found valid, a more compelling connection than 
a mere rational relationship between the law and the specific 
substantial state interest. 
First, the constitution should specifically describe the 
factors to be considered in determining whether a state interest 
 
139. See Cole, supra note 128, at 713-15.  
140. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3.  
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rises to the level of potentially being “substantial.”  These should 
include: the importance of state uniformity in the implicated 
subject matter (e.g., due to the State’s expertise in that 
particular field); the impact of the local legislation on individuals 
or municipalities outside the affected municipality (e.g., if it 
would negatively or unreasonably interfere with daily life or 
essential services); and the manner in which localities and the 
State had managed past control over the topic (e.g., which entity 
had primarily been responsible for or supervised activity within 
that domain).141  While none of these elements would be outcome 
determinative, each factor would serve an instructive role in the 
court’s analysis.142 
Second, and most importantly, the largely deferential 
rational basis standard used in applying the state concern test 
today, which, similar to the equal protection context, is employed 
to validate measures reasonably related to any conceivable 
legitimate state interest, should be abandoned as not 
appropriate for Home Rule analysis.  That is, the rational basis 
standard is not designed to achieve the sensitive balancing of 
local and state interests required to resolve Home Rule 
disputes.143  Instead, just as the identified state interest should 
be required to be “substantial,” so, too, should the relationship 
between the proposed legislation and that state interest be 
required to be “substantial.”  This is because of the basic reasons 
behind the Home Rule provisions—to recognize the important 
role played by local government.  Therefore, the constitution 
should require the application of a standard of review more 
consistent with the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny so that 
the challenged state law must be substantially related to the 
purported state interest.144  This would increase the State’s 
burden to demonstrate how the enactment would actually 
advance the identified substantial state interest, as well as 
prevent the legislature from merely declaring as much in the 
 
141. See Kaplan, supra note 116, at 125.  
142. Id.  
143. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n Inc., 676 
N.E.2d 847, 850-52 (N.Y. 1996). 
144. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[t]o withstand 
intermediate scrutiny, a [challenged law] must be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”).  
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language of the law itself.  Thus, a reviewing court would need 
to be convinced that (i) the legislation falls within one of the 
delineated subject areas identified as a state interest; (ii) the 
state interest expressed in the legislation is indeed substantial 
due, for instance, to the State’s prior control over that topic or 
credible need to maintain uniformity in the field; and (iii) the 
legislation substantially relates to that substantial state 
interest as demonstrated by statistical or other empirical 
evidence. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Home Rule in New York in its current form is, at best, 
tenuous and, at worst, inconsequential.  Home Rule is a vital 
concept and one in dire need of remediation.  Although the 
recommendations proposed above may not cure all of the 
maladies currently afflicting Home Rule in New York, they are 
suggested with the hope that they may provide some of the 
treatment necessary to revive Home Rule. 
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